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At Westminster, there are increasing pressures on select committees to
publish in-house legal advice. We suggest that examining the process of
deciding to publish provides useful insights into the provision,
reception, and use of legal advice, and the dynamics of select com-
mittees generally. We argue that the autonomy of select committees to
decide what use they make of evidence and advice they receive is, in
practice, constrained by the intra-institutional dynamics and practices
of select committees. Committee actors ± parliamentarians, clerks, and
parliamentary lawyers ± each have overlapping, sometimes competing,
roles. Most of the time, these roles and the responsibilities they encom-
pass coincide, but the prospect of publication reveals clear tensions
between the different actors. This is the politics of publication: the
tactical approach of politicians is in tension with the stewardship of
clerks and the professional norms of parliamentary lawyers. We suggest
this tension will only increase in the near future.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2017, the House of Lords European Union Subcommittee on Financial
Affairs took a highly unusual step: it published the advice provided by the
EU Committee legal adviser, Paul Hardy, as part of its inquiry on Brexit and
the EU budget.1 Hardy argued article 50 of the Treaty on European Union
(TEU) allowed the United Kingdom `to leave the EU without being liable for
outstanding financial obligations under the EU budget.'2 The implications of
such advice were politically controversial. But the act of publishing in its
entirety the in-house legal advice provided to the Committee, with the legal
adviser named, also merits serious attention.
Publishing legal advice in this way is rarely done, and then only on an ad
hoc basis: seven times in the past decade. But there are intensifying pressures
on the Westminster parliament ± and indeed in other legislatures ± which
make it more likely to happen. The shift in the centre of influence at West-
minster from the debating chamber towards select committees is one reason.3
In the House of Commons, the Wright reforms (under which chairs and
members of committees are now elected by their peers) will intensify this
trend.4 There have been high-profile hearings in select committees in recent
years which have involved charged legal issues: tax avoidance by Goldman
Sachs and phone hacking by News International, for example.5 Parlia-
mentarians feel increasingly compelled to seek and publish advice as
evidence to justify particular conclusions and ensure influence.6 Brexit, and
all the complexity it entails, is another pressing reason. The process has
forced government and legislature alike to wrangle with the publication of
legal advice. In Westminster, opposition parties have repeatedly pushed the
government to publish its internal advice, such as the legal implications of
the withdrawal agreement.7 The Welsh and Scottish legislatures have also
faced pressures to publish during this period. In early 2018, their presiding
officers took the unusual decision to disclose the legal reasoning for their
2
1 House of Lords EU Committee, Fifteenth Report, Brexit and the EU Budget, HL
(2016±17) 125.
2 id., p. 63.
3 A. Brazier and R. Fox, `Reviewing Select Committee Tasks and Modes of
Operation' (2011) 64 Parliamentary Affairs 354, at 365.
4 L. Fisher, `The Growing Power and Autonomy of House of Commons Select
Committees: Causes and Effects' (2015) 86 Political Q. 419.
5 M. Hodge, Called to Account: How Corporate Bad Behaviour and Government
Waste Combine to Cost Us Millions (2016); House of Commons Committee of
Privileges, First Report, Conduct of witnesses before a select committee: Mr Colin
Myler, Mr Tom Crone, Mr Les Hinton, and News International, HC (2016±17) 662.
6 M. Geddes, `Committee Hearings of the UK Parliament: Who gives Evidence and
Does This Matter?' (2018) 71 Parliamentary Affairs 283.
7 H. Zeffman, `Labour to demand backstop legal advice' Times, 3 November 2018.
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determinations on the legislative competence of the EU `continuity' bills.8
However, publication may increase concerns about the `juridification' of
politics ± that politics is becoming increasingly subject to legal norms.9
We therefore need to examine more systematically the processes of
provision and reception of in-house legal advice to select committees, and
the considerations for and against the publication of that legal advice. We
undertake that task by drawing on published parliamentary reports and
interviews conducted with three sets of core actors in the select committee
setting at Westminster ± parliamentarians, clerks, and parliamentary lawyers.
We argue that the autonomy of select committees to decide what use they
make of evidence and advice they receive is, in practice, constrained by the
intra-institutional dynamics and practices of select committees. Committee
actors each have overlapping, sometimes competing, roles. Most of the time,
these roles (and the responsibilities they encompass) coincide, but the pros-
pect of publication, and any move towards publication as the default, reveals
clear tensions between the different actors. This is the politics of publication:
the tactical approach of politicians is in tension with the stewardship of
clerks and the professional norms of parliamentary lawyers. And in practice
parliamentary staff ± clerks and parliamentary lawyers ± exercise a soft
power capable of constraining committees. This tension has led to legal
advice being published on an unpredictable, ad hoc basis. It is therefore in
the interests of all actors that official guidance be introduced.
This article proceeds as follows. Section I examines how the expansion of
select committees at Westminster has focused on outcomes and impact, at
the cost of examining the processes of decision making. Section II sets out
the methodology for our empirical work. Section III sets out the institutional
framework of select committees: their function and the broad ideal roles of
the three sets of committee actors, namely, parliamentarians, clerks, and
parliamentary lawyers. Section IV then explores these actors' views on the
publication of legal advice.
3
8 National Assembly for Wales, `Law Derived from the European Union (Wales) Bill:
summary of legislative issues' (27 February 2018), at <http://www.assembly.wales/
laid%20documents/pri-ld11431/pri-ld11431-e.pdf>; Scottish Parliament, `With-
drawal from European Union (Continuity) Bill: statements on legislative competence'
(27 February 2018), at <http://www.parliament.scot/S5_Bills/UK%20Withdrawal
%20from%20the%20European%20Union%20(Legal%20Continuity)%20(Scotland)
%20Bill/SPBill28LCS052018.pdf>.
9 For example, D. Nicol, EC Membership and the Judicialization of British Politics
(2001); A. Tomkins, `In Defence of the Political Constitution' (2002) 22 Oxford J.
of Legal Studies 157.
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I. THE EXPANSION OF SELECT COMMITTEES: FOCUSING ON
IMPACT OVER PROCESS, OUTCOMES OVER ACTORS
Since the 1970s, the select committee system at Westminster has progres-
sively expanded, in terms of remit, activity, and power.10 It is now seen as
the primary mechanism through which the Executive is held to account, and
increasingly as a means by which the conduct of third parties can be
scrutinized. Select committee work is now seen as an alternative career path
for MPs, a means for backbench MPs to influence policy and government.11
Research in political science has mostly focused on showing the influence
and impact of select committee work.12 It forms part of a broader recon-
sideration currently taking place: Parliament is now understood to have a
much greater influence over both legislation and policy than previously
thought.13 However, research on the internal dynamics of committees and
the process of committee decision making remains limited.14 Examination of
the work of Westminster parliamentary staff has yet to be seriously under-
taken.15 The literature that does exist (mostly on the European Parliament)
suggests that legislative staff have an important influence over the work and
decisions of committees.16 Understanding legislative staff and their work is
therefore key to unveiling the processes through which select committees
may exert influence.
Legal academics have used committees to interrogate the relationship
between law and politics. In recent years there have been concerns about the
juridification of politics: the colonization of the political sphere by legal
norms.17 Thus, committees have been conceptualized as a means through
4
10 C. Johnson, `Select Committees: Powers and Functions' in Parliament and the Law,
eds. A. Horne and G. Drewry (2018, 2nd edn.) 103.
11 Fisher, op. cit., n. 4.
12 M. Benton and M. Russell, `Assessing the Impact of Parliamentary Oversight
Committees: The Select Committees in the British House of Commons' (2013) 66
Parliamentary Affairs 772; H. White, Select Committees under Scrutiny: The Impact
of Parliamentary Committee Inquiries on Government (2015).
13 For example, M. Russell and P. Cowley, `The Policy Power of the Westminster
Parliament: The `` Parliamentary State'' and the Empirical Evidence' (2016) 29
Governance 121.
14 For an exception, see A. Kelso, `Political Leadership in Parliament: The Role of
Select Committee Chairs in the UK House of Commons' (2016) 4(2) Politics and
Governance 115.
15 But see E. Crewe, `Magi or Mandarins? Contemporary Clerkly Culture' in Essays
on the History of Parliamentary Procedure, ed. P. Evans (2018) 46.
16 For example, T. Winzen, `Technical or political? An Exploration of the Work of
Officials in the Committees of the European Parliament' (2011) 17 J. of Legislative
Studies 27; C. Neuhold and M. Dobbels, `Paper Keepers or Policy Shapers? The
Conditions under which EP Officials Impact on the EU Policy Process' (2015) 13
Comparative European Politics 577.
17 For example, Nicol, op. cit., n. 9; Tomkins, op. cit., n. 9.
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which constitutional values and the rule of law are protected,18 and as a way
of breaking the impasse between the schools of political and legal con-
stitutionalism ± the former viewing Parliament as the more legitimate means
of ensuring accountability and government under the law, the latter viewing
the courts as the better mechanism.19
Some legal academics, advocating a shift towards greater transparency, a
culture of justification, or commitment to deliberative democracy, have
made a broader argument: legal advice to the legislature should be published
± or at least there should be greater public detail on the legal reasoning for
particular decisions by legislative actors.20 Publication would encourage
dialogue and deliberation amongst parliamentarians, and/or assist members
in their duty to evaluate the legality and constitutionality of executive action
and proposed legislation. It is worth noting that there is now an expectation
that legal advice provided by the European Parliament's legal service will be
published.21
Legal research, however, has focused on select committees with legal
remits.22 They do not tell us about how the broader group of select com-
mittees engage with in-house legal advice and the work of parliamentary
lawyers;23 it has also been about the impact and influence of committee work,
and less on the process by which legal advice is provided and received.24 The
implicit framework is inter-institutional: comparing Parliament and the
courts. Intra-institutional analyses, or analyses of the internal work of
5
18 For example, R. Hazell, `Who is the Guardian of Legal Values in the Legislative
Process: Parliament or the Executive?' [2004] Public Law 495; D. Feldman,
`Parliamentary Scrutiny of Legislation and Human Rights' [2002] Public Law 323.
19 M. Hunt, `The Joint Committee on Human Rights' and A. Le Sueur and J. Caird,
`The House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution', both in Parliament and
the Law, eds. A. Horne et al. (2015, 1st edn.) 249, 281.
20 For example, C. McCorkindale and J. Hiebert, `Vetting Bills in the Scottish
Parliament for Legislative Competence' (2017) 21 Edinburgh Law Rev. 319; G.
Appleby and A. Olijnyk, `Parliamentary Deliberation on Constitutional Limits in the
Legislative Process' (2017) 40 University of New South Wales Law J. 976. On a
culture of justification, see M. Hunt, `Introduction' in Parliaments and Human
Rights, eds. M. Hunt et al. (2015) 1, 2.
21 See Regulation 2001/1049/EC regarding public access to European Parliament,
Council and Commission documents [2001] OJ L145/48 and Case T-540/15, De
Capitani v. European Parliament [2018] OJ C161/46.
22 For example, Hazell, op. cit., n. 18; A. Kavanagh, `The Joint Committee on Human
Rights: A Hybrid Breed of Constitutional Watchdog' in Parliaments and Human
Rights, eds. M. Hunt et al. (2015) 115.
23 A rare exception is A. Kennon `Legal Advice to Parliament' in Horne et al. (eds.),
op. cit., n. 19, p. 121.
24 C. Evans and S. Evans, `Messages from the Front Line: Parliamentarians' Per-
spectives on Rights Protection' in The Legal Protection of Human Rights: Sceptical
Essays, eds. T. Campbell et al. (2011) 329; P. Yowell, `The Impact of the Joint
Committee on Human Rights on Legislative Deliberation' in Hunt et al. (eds.), op.
cit., n. 20, p. 141.
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committees, are rare: we are told about parliamentary lawyers in committees,
but rarely about their relationships with other committee actors.
Thus, research in law and political science have concentrated on select
committee impact over process, and outcomes over actors. Select committees
remain `black boxes'. Process and impact, however, cannot be easily separated:
processes may strongly influence outcomes. Examining the processes of
provision and publication of legal advice may offer us insights into committee
decision making, how legislative actors interact, and what committees think
about influence. Moreover, examining actors' views about publication may
also tell us more about the `internal' view of Parliament ± what legislative
actors think is the appropriate relationship between law and politics.
II. METHODOLOGY
This article draws on data from a project examining the provision and
reception of legal support in the four legislatures of the United Kingdom.
Our primary research method are semi-structured elite interviews, conducted
over 2017±18. We aimed to capture a variety of actors: those who provide
legal support ± primarily, in-house parliamentary lawyers ± and those who
receive it, namely, clerks and parliamentarians.
In Westminster, 27 individuals involved in the provision and reception of
in-house legal advice have been interviewed: 11 in-house lawyers, eight
clerks, and eight parliamentarians. We interviewed an equal number of
clerks and lawyers from the House of Commons and the House of Lords
(with some lawyers serving joint committees). Of the parliamentarians, three
are MPs, five are peers (one of whom is a former MP); and half were or are
chairs of select committees. We interviewed former and current office-
holders on condition of anonymity. Interviews were semi-structured,
recorded, and transcribed; they were then coded using NVivo. We have
also drawn on publicly available parliamentary documents ± in particular,
select committee reports, parliamentary debates, and published legal advice
± partly in order to circumvent issues about client confidentiality.
In this article, we look only at the phenomenon of legal advice provided
by in-house parliamentary lawyers to select committees which has been
officially published in full and separately to the main body of a committee
report (as opposed to referred to or interwoven into the text). We do not
cover evidence given by witnesses. This work is important, but it is not given
by in-house staff and therefore not subject to the internal norms governing
permanent parliamentary staff. Moreover, evidence is routinely published;
its publication does not incur an obligation on the committee to agree or
comply with it.25 We also do not cover leaked legal advice, although leaks
6
25 Thus, we regretfully exclude the House of Lords Privileges Committee, First Report,
The Powers of the House of Lords in Respect of Its Members, HL (2008±9) 87,
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touch upon many of the issues we deal with in this article.26
We have identified seven examples through analysis of parliamentary
documents and mentions in interviews.27 That is not many, but the list is not
exhaustive. And, for the reasons already set out, we think that pressure to
publish legal advice is growing ± indeed, six of the seven examples we have
identified took place in the past four years. We explain some of the probable
rationales for their publication in Part IV (actors' views of publication).
However, on the limited data, there is no overriding reason which transcends
the particular circumstances of these examples: the dynamics of select com-
mittees are too unpredictable. Thus, we ultimately suggest the introduction
of written guidance in order to improve consistency.
7
which included the full legal advice of both Baroness Scotland QC (then Attorney-
General) and Lord MacKay (former Lord Chancellor and ex-Law Lord): neither
were `in-house lawyers'.
26 We have identified two examples of leaked legal advice: `Blair's EU safeguards
`` may not be watertight''' Telegraph, 26 June 2007, at <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/
news/uknews/1555656/Blairs-EU-safeguards-may-not-be-watertight.html>;
`Leaked Commons legal analysis of Brexit deal vindicates Trump, contradicts May
and adds to Brexiteers' concerns' BrexitCentral, 2 December 2018, at <https://
brexitcentral.com/leaked-commons-legal-analysis-brexit-deal-vindicates-trump-
contradicts-may-adds-brexiteers-concerns/>.
27 House of Commons Committee on Standards and Privileges, Fourteenth Report,
Privilege: Hacking of Members' Mobile Phones, HC (2010±11) 628; House of
Commons EU Scrutiny Committee, `The Inquiry into the UK Government's
renegotiation of EU membership: Parliamentary Sovereignty and Scrutiny: prelimi-
nary note on the outcome of negotiations' (2016), at <https://www.parliament.uk/
business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/european-scrutiny-
committee/news-parliament-20151/legal-opinion-24-feb-16/>; House of Commons
Public Administration Select Committee, Fifth Report, Lessons for Civil Service
impartiality from the Scottish independence referendum, HC (2014±15) 111; House
of Commons Women and Equalities Committee and the Joint Committee on Human
Rights, `The proposed appointment of David Isaac as the Chair of the Equality and
Human Rights Commission' (26 April 2016), at <https://www.parliament.uk/
documents/commons-committees/women-and-equalities/Correspondence/Letter-
from-David-Isaac-26-04-16.pdf>; House of Commons Public Administration and
Constitutional Affairs Committee, Twelfth Report, Lessons learned from the EU
Referendum, HC (2016±17) 496; House of Lords EU Committee, op. cit., n. 1;
House of Lords Lord Speaker's Committee, Report of the Lord Speaker's Com-
mittee on the Size of the House (2017) ± although, technically, the Lord Speaker's
Committee was not a select committee, but an ad hoc committee established under
the aegis of the Lord Speaker. This report did, however, include the full legal advice
provided by the current House of Lords Counsel to the Chairman of Committees,
James Cooper.
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III. PROVIDING LEGAL ADVICE TO COMMITTEES: FRAMEWORK,
ACTORS, ROLES, AND PROCESSES
In this section, we lay the groundwork to help us understand the intra-
institutional dynamics of select committees, and why proposals to publish in-
house legal advice may cause tension between actors. We set out the institu-
tional framework of select committees, the processes by which they make
decisions, and the actors involved. We then introduce the three core actors in
select committees: parliamentarians, clerks, and parliamentary lawyers, and
their respective, self-perceived roles ± particular ways of behaving within the
select committee context, encompassing particular responsibilities or
duties.28 These roles are ideal: no actor conforms exactly to type.
1. The institutional framework
Select committees are cross-party parliamentary bodies, which primarily
scrutinize executive action and sometimes legislation. They are semi-
autonomous in nature, not dependent from a central authority in Parliament,
and so there are very few `binding' rules on what they can do. Each com-
mittee usually has 11 backbench parliamentarians, including a chair. Com-
mittee composition reflects party balance in the particular House, with
committee chairs being mostly allocated along similar lines. Members and
most select committee chairs are now elected in the Commons, but still
allocated by `the usual channels' (that is, party leaders, convenors, and
whips) in the Lords.
Select committees are supported by a secretariat, consisting of impartial
`permanent' officials who support the legislature. They are permanent in the
sense that they do not leave following a general election; and impartial in
that they are appointed on apolitical criteria and must support all parlia-
mentarians, regardless of political disposition.29 Broadly speaking, Com-
mons committee secretariats are larger, with a clerk, supported by a second
clerk, and a number of committee specialists, assistants, and media officers.
In the Lords, there is usually a clerk, a policy analyst and a committee
assistant. Committees with a legal remit will also have a parliamentary
lawyer or lawyers permanently attached. For instance, the Joint Committee
on Statutory Instruments (JCSI) has seven parliamentary lawyers (although
some work part-time); the Joint Committee on Human Rights (JCHR) has
two, and the Justice Committee one.
Committees scrutinize by inquiring into particular policy areas, taking
evidence from a variety of stakeholders, and publishing reports with recom-
mendations. The aim of this scrutiny is to influence different actors: parlia-
8
28 P. Selznick, Leadership in Administration (1984) 82.
29 House of Commons, Staff Handbook (2013, 6th edn.) paras. 5.1±5.2; House of
Lords, Staff Handbook (2012) para.12.1.
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ment, the government, and the wider public. Select committees cannot force
change: their effectiveness is `measured in terms of the influence which
committees exercise, both with individual members of each House and . . .
with departments.'30 Committees, and in particular their chairs, must
therefore consider how to maximize their influence. There are a range of
factors affecting the impact of a committee report, which both academics and
interviewees agree upon: the quality of its arguments, the strength of its
evidential basis, committee unanimity, the reputation of the committee and
its members across the House, and the committee's media profile.31 These
considerations are interconnected, but of them, interviewees emphasized
committee unanimity and reputation as the most important in ensuring the
influence of a report.
2. The tacticians: parliamentarians
The work and objectives of committees are driven primarily by the perceived
roles and goals of parliamentarians. Parliamentarians were acknowledged by
all interviewees as the actors whose goals should be given most deference.
As Crewe argues:
An essential element of the clerkly culture in the Commons is the recognition,
forcefully socialised in new recruits, that `election' confers a power and
authority that mere appointment can never confer. Elected Members are . . .
fundamentally different beings.32
Peers lack elected legitimacy, but are deferred to because they fulfil other
modes of representation ± in particular, they are able to voice views not
heard in the Commons, and often have expertise that elected members
lack.33
MPs usually belong to a political party, and they tend to be amateurs
rather than experts. Within the framework of committees, parliamentarians
have a number of key goals: re-election, the promotion of party objectives,
influence within and outside the House, and the production of good public
policy.34 Lords share similar goals to MPs (except re-election), but differ
slightly in nature: most belong to a political group, but many are non-
aligned, and many are experts in their field.
The priority given to each goal differs with each member, but within the
select committee context, the broad role of parliamentarians, or way of
9
30 Feldman, op. cit., n. 18, p. 347.
31 id.; D. Natzler and M. Hutton, `Select Committees: Scrutiny aÁ la Carte?' in The
Future of Parliament: Issues for a New Century, ed. P. Giddings (2005) 88, 96;
Benton and Russell, op. cit., n. 12.
32 Crewe, op. cit., n. 15, p. 57.
33 P. Dorey and M. Purvis, `Representation in the Lords' in Exploring Parliament, eds.
C. Leston-Bandeira and L. Thompson (2018) 244.
34 Adapted from R. Fenno, Congressmen in Committees (1973). See, also, Geddes, op.
cit., n. 6.
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behaving, is tactical. Finding means to exert influence is usually key: as
former MP Nick de Bois suggests, `the only power you have as an MP is the
power to influence.'35 In committees, however, influence must achieved
within committees via agreement. This can be difficult, given that parlia-
mentarians are, as a group, both fiercely partisan and highly autonomous ±
particularly in the elected Commons. Kelso notes: `Select committee
scrutiny of government, and its policies and decision making, can only be
maximized if members operate mostly consensually for most of the time.' 36
Thus, committees deliberate in private, spending much time seeking
consensus in order to ensure influence. A committee chair stated:
[A report] obviously always carries more weight if you can get it unanimous,
so . . . on one or two occasions, I've toned down what the officials have put in
the draft . . . because . . . some members of the committee I knew wouldn't
wear it in that formulation, but we could get to a position in the middle . . .
[S]ometimes these reports are not an end, you know, they're important
themselves, but they also trigger further discussion and debate . . .37
In our interviews, parliamentarians asserted their autonomy to decide. This
was for a variety of reasons: because of the need to seek consensus; because
parliamentarians understood politics best; and because parliamentarians were
the most legitimate actors within the committee, and therefore best able to
exercise effective influence:
You cannot have a committee of House of Commons officials ± or lawyers ±
telling the government `your laws are a load of bollocks' . . . It has to have the
imprimatur of parliamentarians.38
The corollary of this is that clerks and parliamentary lawyers are sub-
ordinate: `Clerks are there to advise, we decide.'39
Parliamentary staff exist to support the work of parliamentarians ± here, in
the institutional form of committees. Finally, of all our interviewees,
parliamentarians were the least inclined to reflect on the medium- or long-
term interests of parliament as an institution. They tended to focus instead on
tactical matters, and the specific committee they sat on. Thus, one MP
argued, `there is . . . this culture where the clerks are more loyal to their
organisation than they are to the committee, and that is a prevalent culture,
and that's not very good.'40 Parliamentarians rarely make claims on behalf of
Parliament as an institutional collectivity.41
10
35 N. de Bois, Confessions of a Recovering MP (2018) 30.
36 Kelso, op. cit., n. 14, p. 119.
37 Interviewee 20, MP (26 July 2017).
38 Interviewee 27, peer and former MP (13 September 2017).
39 Interviewee 20, MP (26 July 2017).
40 Interviewee 54, MP (16 January 2018).
41 D. Judge and C. Leston-Bandeira, `The Institutional Representation of Parliament'
(2018) 66 Political Studies 154, at 162.
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3. The stewards: clerks
Clerks have traditionally been a socially distinct group, a career cadre of
impartial officials: the majority have spent most, if not all, of their working
lives in Parliament.42 They have a cohesive set of shared understandings
about their roles, and what the other core actors should be doing ± a `clerkly
culture'.43 They are trained as generalists rather than specialists, and have a
broad set of responsibilities: clerking for the chamber, managing com-
mittees, or the administration of Parliament. Here, we look only at managing
committees.
Clerks see themselves as having a broad set of official responsibilities in
relation to select committees.44 First, they have management responsibilities:
they manage the activities of the committee, including line-managing com-
mittee staff. Second, clerks advise committees as experts in parliamentary
procedure. Third, they brief members on research and witness evidence, and
assist them in assessing that evidence. Finally, clerks offer to the committee
a degree of political judgement on how to maximize influence. Perhaps in
recognition of these responsibilities, the clerk always sits next to the com-
mittee chair in meetings, their physical proximity reflecting the importance
of the clerk to the committee.
Clerks ultimately see themselves as sharing responsibility for the reputa-
tion of their committees. This means preventing committees from damaging
their credibility through ill-informed conclusions and any other behaviour.
As one clerk put it:
You've got people making arguments to a committee, whether they are legal
or any other arguments. And your responsibility to the committee is to point
them to the best range of advice, witnesses . . . to do your best to help them not
reach patently unfounded or absurd conclusions.45
Management of the committee and protection of its reputation are
committee-specific responsibilities. But clerks also see themselves as having
a set of long-term, institution-wide responsibilities as well: a stewardship
role. Crewe notes:
While Members are under huge pressure to respond to the everyday pressures
from the media, their parties and their constituencies, Clerks take the longer
view, coaxing committees towards greater effectiveness in seeing the bigger
picture, or at least seeing it from many angles.46
In this respect, they are particularly concerned to protect the impartiality of
parliamentary staff, and the autonomy of Parliament.
11
42 Crewe, op. cit., n. 15, p. 56.
43 id.
44 M. Geddes and J. Mulley, `Supporting Members and Peers' in Leston-Bandeira and
Thompson (eds.), op. cit., n. 33, pp. 33, 40.
45 Interviewee 21, clerk (27 July 2017).
46 Crewe, op. cit., n. 15, p. 61.
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Several clerks interviewed stressed the importance of staff impartiality: it
was not for them to offer their views on policy questions. As an extension of
this responsibility, some clerks considered it their duty to police the
impartiality of parliamentary lawyers, and to counsel chairs if they believed
that lawyers were straying too far into matters of policy and advocating
particular positions: `I think it's the clerk's job to monitor whether it's
happening, and to have the first attempt at stopping it.'47
Closely linked to impartiality is the clerks' view that they are responsible
for protecting the autonomy of committees and Parliament. This stems from
their ongoing engagement with parliamentarians and clerks' view of parlia-
mentarians as having an elevated status. This responsibility has a defensive
aspect: clerks are sensitized to identify any matter which might engage
Parliament's exclusive cognisance ± the right to regulate its own proceed-
ings. But it also has a positive aspect ± asserting Parliament's autonomy.
Feldman notes the response of the clerks when working as a parliamentary
lawyer for the JCHR, and having drafted an initial set of letters for
government departments:
I couched these letters in polite (some would say obsequious) terms: `The
Committee would be most grateful . . .' These expressions were ruthlessly
excised by the Lords and Commons Clerks of the Committee, who reminded
me that the ministers are accountable to Parliament, not the other way round:
the two Houses are the boss . . .48
The clerks interviewed saw themselves as distinct from parliamentary
lawyers: they understood `the political' ± parliamentarians, the Houses, the
sphere of politics ± better, perhaps because of their proximity to parlia-
mentarians and because of their particular expertise. As one clerk put it:
lawyers being lawyers, they're always going to be cautionary. Me being a
parliamentary official, I'm naturally, of course, cautious, but I'm also from a
political perspective . . . more inclined to want to hold the line further up, to be
assertive on behalf of Parliament.49
4. The professionals: parliamentary lawyers
Parliamentary lawyers are in-house lawyers employed by one of the Houses
of Parliament to provide legal support.50 They should be distinguished from
lawyer-politicians; parliamentarians' staff who are legally qualified, but who
serve in a partisan capacity; and parliamentary counsel, government lawyers
who draft executive primary legislation. This definition also excludes
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48 D. Feldman, `None, one or several? Perspectives on the UK's Constitutions' (2005)
64 Cambridge Law J. 329, at 344.
49 Interviewee 21, clerk (27 July 2017).
50 See, generally, Kennon, op. cit., n. 23.
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specialist advisers, who are appointed to support a committee for a single
inquiry: they are temporary, not permanent staff.51 Parliamentary lawyers
are small in number: currently, there are 16 in the House of Commons and 6
in the Lords.52
In contrast to clerks, parliamentary lawyers at Westminster have tradi-
tionally not been a career cadre. Few have spent their working lives in
Parliament: rather, they are mostly former government lawyers, with a small
group coming from `the outside', that is, academics and barristers. More-
over, parliamentary lawyers at Westminster historically have not formed a
unified service. They have been line-managed lightly, sometimes by clerks,
sometimes by more senior lawyers, and organized functionally, attached to a
particular committee or office. Their organization has reflected the nature of
Parliament: a body of separate constituent parts ± the Houses, select
committees ± each of which act in a largely semi-autonomous manner from
the other.53 For all these reasons, parliamentary lawyers lack the cohesive,
shared norms of clerks: what links them together is their professional norms.
The work of parliamentary lawyers is not easily defined, partly because of
their compartmentalization and ad hoc growth at Westminster. Like clerks,
they have a range of responsibilities in Parliament, but here we focus on their
work with committees. Within committees their roles vary, because of remit
and the particular personalities of chair, clerk, and parliamentary lawyer.
Generally, however, in line with committees' principal objective, parlia-
mentary lawyers work to enhance scrutiny:
my job was to make . . . an MP's scrutiny . . . more effective . . . Assess, you
know, the advantages and disadvantages of a proposal. Effective scrutiny is
providing your members with the advice they need actually to be asking the
right questions of government, to tease out the stuff the government doesn't
want to share.54
These lawyers perform this scrutiny-enhancing work in a number of ways.
Much of their work revolves around explanation: explaining existing legal
frameworks to members `in a way, as far as possible, that non-lawyers could
grasp.'55 They support committees by identifying the key legal issues and
suitable witnesses to inquiries, and corresponding with witnesses and
government departments. Sometimes they provide legal advice in the
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51 The House of Lords Constitution Committee's two part-time legal advisers sit on the
`penumbra'. They are appointed on a sessional basis, but remain with the Committee
for much longer than a single inquiry, so we class them as parliamentary lawyers.
52 These numbers are calculated from internal documents. It should also be noted that
some only work part-time. Neither have we included here paralegal staff (two) and
the 1±2 lawyers working for the Joint Procurement Service.
53 B. Yong, `The Governance of Parliament' in Horne and Drewry (eds.), op. cit., n.
10, p. 75.
54 Interviewee 5, parliamentary lawyer (25 May 2017).
55 Interviewee 2, parliamentary lawyer (23 March 2017). See, also, Kennon, op. cit., n.
23, p. 133.
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traditional sense: drafting a written opinion giving a view about the law or
the constitutionality of a particular action. They also critique the quality of
primary and secondary legislative texts and draft amendments to reflect the
committee's conclusions. In these various ways, parliamentary lawyers
provide what Mulley and Kinghorn describe as `non-litigious legal advice'.56
At their most general, they engage in problem solving, offering views `on a
way of approaching a problem, or approaching a report'.57
Several interviewees saw the work of lawyers being directly linked to the
committee's reputation ± and behind that, influence. One clerk suggested
that one responsibility of parliamentary lawyers is to ensure that `the
committee is aware of potential criticisms of the position they're considering
taking from the legal community.'58 One parliamentary lawyer explained:
the absolute minimum role is to stop the committee from doing anything
embarrassing, either during evidence sessions or in its published reports . . .
The reputation of the committee really depends on the usefulness and
acceptance of its reports. So, it takes time to build up a reputation. But it can
be relatively easily lost once you've built it up. So that was my first job,
particularly as it related to the law.59
But parliamentary lawyers also saw themselves as having a particular profes-
sional role, which came with particular responsibilities. These responsibilities
overlapped, to some extent, with the stewardship role of the clerks ± in
particular, the preservation of their impartiality and the autonomy of the
committee and Parliament. These, however, tended to be narrower, framed in
the professional language of the lawyer±client relationship. So, for instance,
lawyer interviewees insisted that it was for the client to decide what to do with
their advice: `[W]e advise the client and then the client decides what to do.'60
This stance reflects the `standard conception' of the lawyer's role ± in
particular, the principles of non-accountability (that lawyers should not be
held responsible for their client's actions) and neutrality (that it is not for
lawyers to judge their clients).61 Both principles are based on client
autonomy.62
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Legislation and Accountability, eds. A. Horne and A. Le Sueur (2016) 39, 48.
57 Interviewee 2, parliamentary lawyer (23 March 2017). See, also, D. Howarth, Law
as Engineering: Thinking About What Lawyers Do (2013) 30.
58 Interviewee 11, clerk (29 June 2017).
59 Interviewee 2, parliamentary lawyer (23 March 2017).
60 Interviewee 12, parliamentary lawyer (29 June 2017).
61 A. Boon, Lawyers' Ethics and Professional Responsibility (2015) 112±13.
62 S. Pepper, `The Lawyer's Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, a Problem, and Some
Possibilities' (1986) 11 Law & Social Inquiry 613.
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5. Providing legal advice to committees: everyday practice
Legal advice may be sought by any committee in an inquiry or when
scrutinizing legislation. Usually, this is requested via the clerk, the
committee's members or chair. This advice comes primarily from in-house
parliamentary lawyers. `Legal advice' itself is a process and not an event: it
can cover the provision of information to the specific application of the law,
and any of the various stages in-between. We focus on the more formal side
of the spectrum, as it is the most likely to be published.
Where written advice is required, it will be drafted by the parliamentary
lawyer and sent to the clerk and chair, or circulated directly to the com-
mittee. It will then be discussed in a private session of the committee, with
the parliamentary lawyer present, if necessary, to explain and sometimes
justify their advice.
Non-publication of in-house legal advice is the norm. So, for instance, the
House of Commons Privileges Committee in its inquiry on witnesses' con-
duct before select committees (stemming from issues raised by the
Commons' Culture, Media and Sport inquiry on phone hacking) rejected
calls to have its internal legal advice published, citing both parliamentary
and legal professional privilege.63 Where in-house legal advice is published
without authorization, it is treated as a violation of parliamentary privilege.64
This norm of non-publication exists partly because much `legal advice' is
mundane: it is informative, not dispositive. Alternatively, views on the state
of the law may differ substantially, so that counsel's legal advice amounts to
a form of opinion: it offers the committee no certainty. But the norm also
exists because where legal advice is dispositive, it is usually woven into the
committee report, or witness evidence covers the same ground. As we shall
see in Part IV, the publication of written legal advice has arisen from very
specific, unique circumstances. In such cases, the legal advice has taken on
an added significance which has elevated it from the advice routinely
supplied by parliamentary staff supporting a committee.
The result, however, is that there is no unique process by which
confidential advice is authorized for publication. Further, there is an absence
of official guidance on what considerations should be taken into account
where a committee expresses an intention to publish in-house legal advice.65
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Premature disclosure of select committee papers, HC (2007±8) 1212.
65 To our knowledge, this is also true of the devolved assemblies.
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IV. ACTORS' VIEWS ON THE PUBLICATION OF LEGAL ADVICE
1. Consensus on committee autonomy and the value of transparency
Having established the framework within which legal advice is provided to
committees, the goals and roles of its main actors, and the processes through
which legal advice is given (and on occasion published), we now turn to a
discussion of the consequences of potential publication.
Interviews revealed two key points of consensus amongst all actors on the
publication of legal advice. First, select committees have autonomy over the
use of the evidence and information which they receive. Second, all recog-
nized that, under certain circumstances, select committees can publically
disclose legal advice in the interests of transparency.
The dominant norm identified on the issue of publishing legal advice was
the autonomy of select committee decision making. There were two dimen-
sions to this. First, actors were united in the view that committee decisions
are the political responsibility of committee members, not parliamentary
staff.66 A number of clerks and lawyers expressed the view that decisions
ultimately taken require `political backing'67 and `committee ownership'.68
As one lawyer explained,
[I]t's really important that they take responsibility for speaking in their own
voice, and issuing reports ± which may have been drafted for them by others,
but which they'd had to discuss and agree with whether or not they want to put
it out there in their name.69
This dimension of committee autonomy is reflected in current working
practices. Clerks and parliamentary lawyers have low visibility. Most of their
work is conducted `behind the scenes',70 with the consequence that their
work is `little noticed outside or even inside Westminster'.71 One clerk said:
To be honest, committees are often totally unaware of the in-house staff that
are helping them ± beyond the clerk . . . [M]ost members of committee will
probably be unaware that there were legal advisers working with the
committee.72
These arrangements reinforce the autonomy of the committee, and also help to
ensure that staff are unlikely to become the subject of political controversy.
Notably, several of the clerks and parliamentary lawyers interviewed preferred
this arrangement.
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67 Interviewee 9, parliamentary lawyer (27 June 2017).
68 Interviewee 11, clerk (29 June 2017).
69 Interviewee 22, parliamentary lawyer (27 July 2017).
70 Feldman, op. cit., n. 18, p. 343.
71 Natzler and Hutton, op. cit., n. 31, p. 92.
72 Interviewee 11, clerk (29 June 2017).
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The second dimension of this autonomy was that, in principle, committees
have full discretion over how they make use of the evidence and information
which they receive, including the advice of parliamentary staff. An MP
explained that `[t]he members will decide how much weight they give to
[advice] in the overall report.'73 Likewise, a peer argued that `you have to
think about the freedom of the select committee . . . They're not obliged to
accept the advice.'74 This was a political judgement, subject to political
considerations ± such as the potential impact on the House.
Clerks agreed. One argued that there were few constraints on how a
committee makes use of advice: `. . . the committee might not agonise over
legal advice. It might just say, `` Oh, there it is''.'75 Another clerk emphasized
that `[u]ltimately, a committee can decide to publish anything.'76 From this
perspective, deciding whether or not to publish legal advice forms part of the
committee's overall assessment of the evidence and information it has
received ± an assessment intrinsic to its autonomy.
Parliamentary lawyers agreed, but often expressed this by raising legal
professional privilege (LPP), a right of confidentiality which `belongs to the
client',77 and client autonomy:
[T]o an extent your advice is . . . the clients' to do what they want with.78
My advice is to the committee . . . it's their advice . . . If they want to publish it
for political reasons or policy reasons, then I didn't feel like I could stand in
the way of that.79
It was not for lawyers to posit views on what should be done with the advice
they had given: publishing the advice was a political judgement for their
client, the committee. This stance reflects the principle of non-accountability
(that is, lawyers are not responsible for the client's actions), a core aspect of
the standard conception of the lawyer±client relationship.80 Thus, lawyers'
professional norms further reinforce the autonomy of committees to decide
how they weigh up and make use of evidence and information.
Interviewees acknowledged that transparency might require the public
disclosure of legal advice under certain circumstances. This turned on the
significance of the legal advice to a committee's work. Interviewees thought
that committees should be transparent in terms of what shaped their thinking:
this could justify the publication of advice which, though initially given in
confidence, had played a significant role in their conclusions. One peer
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73 Interviewee 20, MP (26 July 2017).
74 Interviewee 8, peer (22 June 2017).
75 Interviewee 6, clerk (26 May 2017).
76 Interviewee 11, clerk (29 June 2017).
77 Three Rivers District Council & Others v. Governor and Company of the Bank of
England (No 6) [2005] 1 A.C. 610, para. 37 (Baroness Hale).
78 Interviewee 10, parliamentary lawyer (27 June 2017).
79 Interviewee 5, parliamentary lawyer (25 May 2017).
80 Boon, op. cit., n. 61, p. 113.
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explained that where a legal question is the `crucial issue', there may be a
need for the committee to `make clear the legal arguments . . . which we had
found convincing'.81 Under such circumstances, there was nothing `im-
proper'82 about a committee deciding to publish advice. Clerks and lawyers
agreed. One clerk suggested that `if . . . it's something that's really influenced
the committee, the committee might decide to publish it to show why they
make a particular recommendation.'83 Similarly, a parliamentary lawyer
indicated that they would not oppose the publication of legal advice where it
had formed the basis of a `critical part'84 of a committee report.
Conversely, interviewees saw no point in publishing advice which had
little influence on a committee's conclusions. One peer argued that `. . .
whether they should publish [advice] or not sometimes depends on whether
they accept it or not.'85 Likewise, a clerk suggested that `. . . legal advice is
just that, it's advice. If the committee gets advice and it doesn't decide to
follow it, what's the point of publishing it?'86
2. Where actors diverge: tactics, stewardship, and professional values
If there is agreement or convergence centred around committee autonomy
and transparency, why is non-publication the norm at Westminster? It is
partly because legal advice is mostly mundane, or, where relevant, woven
into committee reports. But it is also because committees have, thus far,
generally exercised their autonomy by refraining from publishing advice.
However, the prospect of committees publishing advice more frequently, or
a move toward publication as the default, revealed a divergence between
parliamentarians on the one hand and parliamentary staff on the other ±
stemming from their different roles.
Parliamentarians rarely showed concern about the implications of pub-
lication. Their considerations were primarily tactical, focusing on whether
the published advice was likely to enhance the influence of a committee
report. By contrast, no clerk or lawyer interviewed was unequivocally open
to the prospect of advice being published more regularly. Actors were guided
by different, but often overlapping, sets of considerations derived from their
roles. Clerks expressed a variety of institutional or stewardship concerns
over the potential ramifications of publishing advice, based on their respon-
sibilities to the House as a whole. Parliamentary lawyers, on the other hand,
were primarily concerned with the professional implications for lawyer±
client relationships across the legislature.
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85 Interviewee 8, peer (22 June 2017).
86 Interviewee 6, clerk (26 May 2017).
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(a) The tactical concerns of parliamentarians
The key consideration for parliamentarians was tactical: whether or not the
publication of legal advice was likely to enhance the influence of a com-
mittee report. Here, there was a mixture of views. One MP, for example, had
`absolutely no doubt' that they would publish legal advice if it supported
their committee's agenda; but they also insisted they would not publish the
advice if they `didn't believe it was credible'.87 One peer saw a distinct
advantage in publishing advice: issuing legal analysis `in the legal advisor's
own words' could fortify a committee's conclusions on legal issues, provid-
ing `authority to our report'.88 Another MP argued that a committee report
would be less influential if its content was too legalistic: `the ultimate
product . . . is political rather than legal . . . not aimed at lawyers', and `aimed
principally at the House of Commons'.89 The underlying consideration was
influence. This echoes a recent report for the Parliamentary Office of
Science and Technology on the use of research by parliamentarians, which
observed that parliamentarians generally rely on research not only to support
effective scrutiny, but to `enhance the credibility of arguments put
forward'.90
Lawyers recognized the tactic of publishing advice to enhance committee
influence. One suggested that it is a `deliberate step' purporting to `add
weight' to a committee's views.91 Another lawyer suggested that MPs were
`much more interested in . . . the immediate news value',92 and so legal
advice might be used more opportunistically. Publishing legal advice might
offer a `convenient' way to gain a quick political advantage, `not in . . .
necessarily any sort of party, political sense, but, you know, to be seen to be
acting'.93
Three recent examples of legal advice being published by select com-
mittees in Westminster exemplify tactical and transparency considerations in
play. In terms of tactical considerations, the Chair of the EU Sub-Committee
on Finance, Baroness Falkner, justified the decision to publish legal advice
about the financial implications of Brexit in its report partly on the basis that
the subject of the United Kingdom's financial contributions to the EU was
`highly contentious',94 having `received a significant amount of attention in
the press and elsewhere'.95 The Committee was eager to fortify its position
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90 C. Kenny et al., The Role of Research in the UK Parliament: Volume 1 (2017) 11;
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91 Interviewee 12, parliamentary lawyer (29 June 2017).
92 Interviewee 19, parliamentary lawyer (26 July 2017).
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on a very controversial issue. Transparency considerations were also evident:
the Committee acknowledged in its report that its legal assessment drew
`heavily'96 on the in-house legal advice, and the Chair explained that the
Committee decided to publish the advice in full `so that all could see the
analysis behind our judgment'.97
Tactical and transparency considerations were also apparent in the House
of Commons Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee
(PACAC) report, Lessons learned from the EU referendum.98 This report
included five pieces of written legal advice from then Speaker's Counsel,
Michael Carpenter, on three separate legal questions which arose during the
course of the Committee's inquiry. These were published online in the
months immediately prior to the 2016 referendum. At the tactical level, it is
worth noting that the PACAC chair, Bernard Jenkin, has long been a
proponent of leaving the EU.99 The Committee's use and publication of legal
advice during this inquiry could be seen as a political act to level the playing
field in favour of Eurosceptics, particularly given the relatively pro-
European stance of the Prime Minister and his front bench. Transparency
considerations were also present. The Committee argued, for instance, that
publishing the legal advice of Speaker's Counsel was necessary, given the
`significant difference of opinion'100 which had surfaced between the
Committee, the government, and the Electoral Commission in relation to the
interpretation of particular provisions of the Political Parties, Elections and
Referendums Act 2000.
A final example is the recent 2017 report of the Lords Speaker's Com-
mittee on the Size of the House,101 tasked with finding a practically viable,
non-legislative means to reduce the membership of the Lords. Here, the legal
advice from the Counsel to the Chairman of Committees (added in an
appendix) was deployed for a tactical purpose. The advice was used to
bolster the attractiveness of the specific means proposed by the Committee
(requiring new members to make an undertaking to serve for 15 years only)
as legally and constitutionally sound.102 Indeed, the Committee chair, Lord
Burns, argued in the debate on the report that the Committee had had `robust
legal advice that the House has the powers to enforce the undertaking to
retire.'103
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(b) The stewardship concerns of clerks
By contrast, clerks had grave concerns over the publication of legal advice.
These stemmed from the clerks' stewardship role in the committee setting
and across the House.
First, several clerks expressed concern about the implications of
publication for a committee's reputation. If a committee published legal
advice which it had chosen to act against, it risked undermining its position
by revealing that it was deliberately contravening the legal advice it had been
given. Second, at a more institutional level, clerks were anxious that
publishing advice risked the gradual erosion of confidentiality between
members and parliamentary staff generally. Once there was an expectation
that one type of advice should be published, similar expectations could easily
develop in relation to other types of in-house advice. As one clerk put it, `the
harm is not so much about it being legal advice as about any advice'.104 This
was about maintaining institutional autonomy. For clerks, creating an
expectation that any type of in-house advice will be published risked sur-
rendering the autonomy of committees generally to decide whether or not to
publish such advice in future. This is consistent with Fasone and Lupo's
argument that a sudden increase in legislative transparency can result in a
`runaway process' in which a legislature begins to lose control over the flow
and volume of information which it receives and transmits to the public.105
Third, and even more significantly, the publication of legal advice was
considered by some clerks to engage the defensive aspect of their steward
role in upholding the autonomy of Parliament as an institution. Clerks view
themselves as responsible for policing on Parliament's behalf the `very grey
area'106 between the jurisdictions of Parliament and the courts. Thus, several
clerks were concerned that publishing legal advice could encourage judicial
scrutiny of parliamentary proceedings, contrary to Article IX of the Bill of
Rights 1689.107 As one clerk argued:
. . . publishing legal advice, and then going against it is just inviting the courts
in . . . All it is doing is increasing the impression that this is what you might
call a court legal matter rather than a parliamentary legal matter.108
This reflects a concern among clerks over the use of select committee reports
in litigation proceedings. The former clerk of the House of Commons, Lord
Lisvane, recently argued that Parliament's principal Article IX problem now
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relates to select committees. The legal content of committee reports, he notes,
provide `grist to many a litigant's mill'.109 Another Commons clerk, Eve
Samson, suggests that traditional fears about the judicial erosion of free
speech within Parliament are misplaced: `The danger, if it exists, lies in the
more subtle use of proceedings.'110 This points to the potential, long-term
risks that publishing advice might have on parliamentary autonomy ±
juridification, or the potential encroachment of judicial norms into both
committee proceedings and parliamentary business more generally. Thus, the
deference of clerks to committee autonomy is tempered by their respon-
sibilities to the broader institution, Parliament.
(c) The professional concerns of parliamentary lawyers
Like clerks, parliamentary lawyers had concerns over the potential ramifica-
tions of publishing legal advice. To some extent, these echoed clerks'
concerns about committee autonomy and reputation:
. . . it feeds an expectation of publication, so that, on those occasions where the
committee prefers not to publish the advice . . . the expectation may have
become difficult to disappoint. And a failure to publish advice in circum-
stances where there has previously been a tendency to publish it is likely to
lead to the drawing of inferences that the committee's report has parted
company with the legal advice it has received.111
In contrast to clerks, however, lawyers' concerns were mostly expressed in
terms of their professional role and norms. What caused lawyers con-
sternation were the potential implications for core aspects of the lawyer±
client relationship in the legislative context.
First, several parliamentary lawyers were concerned that publishing legal
advice would undermine a key rationale of LPP: the need for a relationship
based on frankness between client and lawyer. The courts have long held that
LPP enables `. . . clients and their legal advisers to communicate with each
other with complete candour',112 ensuring that `lawyers give their clients
sound advice, accurate as to the law and sensible as to their conduct.'113
Thus, the lawyers thought that publishing legal advice more frequently could
have a `chilling effect'114 on the way that it is given. Several emphasized
that, as a matter of ordinary practice, they prepare their written advice on the
assumption that it could be published. However, the presumption of con-
22
109 Lord Lisvane, `The Courts and Parliament' [2016] Public Law 272, at 277.
110 E. Samson, `Privilege: The Unfolding Debate with the Courts' in Essays on the
History of Parliamentary Procedure: In Honour of Thomas Erskine May, ed. P.
Evans (2017) 287, 306.
111 Email from interviewee 73, parliamentary lawyer (18 July 2018).
112 Prudential PLC and Prudential (Gibraltar) Ltd v. Special Commissioner of Income
Tax and Philip Pandolfo (HM Inspector of Taxes) [2013] 2 A.C. 185, para. 100.
113 Three Rivers District Council & Others, op. cit., n. 77, para. 61.
114 Interviewee 22, parliamentary lawyer (27 July 2017).
ß 2019 The Authors. Journal of Law and Society published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Cardiff University (CU)
fidentiality which ordinarily exists between lawyers and parliamentarians
allowed the former to bring a degree of nuance and individuality to their
advice. As one lawyer explained:
That's my legal advice. I'm sort of accountable for it because [it's] my name
on the tin . . . [M]y views are not always mainstream views, and I can make
that point . . . [I]f I give a view, I can do it personally, and that would have the
proper weight . . . and I can explain, if necessary, that this view is not shared by
. . . the majority of the academic community.115
Increasing the publication of legal opinions was therefore considered likely
to cause a decline in their frankness and even their advisory character.116
One lawyer suggested that it could reduce the lawyers' role to the provision
of legal information, rather than advice, similar to the research notes already
produced by the House of Commons Library.117
Parliamentary lawyers were also concerned that publishing legal advice
could potentially impinge on their ability to support multiple clients within
the legislature. Parliamentary lawyers assist in many areas of parliamentary
activity. Moreover, the pool of potential clients has expanded in the wake of
the Brexit referendum, with the establishment of the Exiting the European
Union Select Committee and the current salience of EU legal considerations
across select committee work. This has led to a shift in legal advice being
labelled `committee notes' to `legal notes' which are potentially made
available to multiple committees.
With these expanded and multifaceted client loyalties, the publication of
legal advice gives rise to two concerns. The first is the procedural question of
how confidentiality is waived where one particular actor seeks to publish
advice that may have been supplied to multiple committees. Waiver of LPP
depends on identifying the client who is legally entitled to exercise that
waiver.118 While some parliamentary lawyers suggested that the House as a
whole could be the ultimate client, determining who is entitled to exercise
the waiver at a practical level can be a vexed task:
[I]t's sort of slightly difficult `cause who is the client? . . . [A]nd that's still an
issue which is sort of not fully resolved . . . If it's to be published . . . who
would be the client to waive legal professional privilege?119
[T]here's no clarity about [who is your client] in Parliament. There's no kind
of distilled wisdom about it. You come in as a lawyer, and you have to work it
out for yourself.120
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The second ± and related ± issue was that publishing legal advice could
disrupt a core working practice which enables parliamentary lawyers to
support their multiple clients across the legislature. Several interviewees
explained how written legal advice in Westminster is often shared informally
between parliamentary officials and committees. As one lawyer put it:
You try to work it so that somebody who has an official position where they
have themselves do something on behalf of the House as a whole, you work it
around so that they have the benefit of your advice. And sometimes, it means,
you know, a clerk passing on your advice to a committee that actually isn't
your client at all, because once in a blue moon, they want some legal advice.
Well, of course, you give it.121
Similarly, one clerk explained that parliamentary lawyers provide advice
in the knowledge that the clerks will `circulate it to a fair number of
people'122 internally. The sharing of legal advice, they suggested, is per-
ceived as `communications between colleagues'123 rather than the disclosure
of confidential advice. This informality allows parliamentary lawyers to
bypass the difficulty of identifying who is entitled to waive confidentiality,
and maintain what Kennon has described as `a culture in which lawyers are
willing within a small organisation to help out wherever required'.124 The
problems of client waiver involved in publishing legal advice would make
such arrangements difficult to maintain.
In summary, interviews revealed that the prospect of publication tugs at the
various client loyalties of parliamentary lawyers in Westminster. Like clerks,
parliamentary lawyers recognized the autonomy of the committee to evaluate
and make use of their advice in whatever way they deem appropriate.
However, this was tempered by a resistance to any development which could
affect their ability to fulfil their obligations across the legislature as a whole.
This finding reinforces American scholarship on the work of legislative
lawyers. Like Westminster lawyers, congressional and state-level legislative
lawyers often view their role through the lawyer±client framework.125 But
there is disagreement as to whether the loyalty of these actors is owed to
particular officials, committees or the legislature as a whole, and scholars have
noted explicitly the difficulties which this poses for client confidentiality.126
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121 Interviewee 9, parliamentary lawyer (22 June 2017).
122 Interviewee 21, clerk (27 July 2017).
123 id.
124 Kennon, op. cit., n. 23, p. 124.
125 For example, R. Marchant, `Representing Representatives: Ethical Considerations
for the Legislature's Attorneys' (2003) 6 New York University J. of Legislation and
Public Policy 439; M. Stern, `Ethical Obligations of Congressional Lawyers' (2008)
63 NYU Annual Survey of American Law 191. However, other authors entirely reject
the applicability of the lawyer±client paradigm in the legislative context: M.
Glennon, `Who's the Client? Legislative Lawyering through the Rear-View Mirror'
(1998) 61 Law and Contemporary Problems 21.
126 Stern, id., p. 196.
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(d) The politicization of legislative staff and their work
A final concern, shared by clerks and parliamentary lawyers, was that
publishing advice could politicize their work, and thereby threaten the
perception of their impartiality among parliamentarians. This concern should
be understood in light of a number of general norms and working practices in
Westminster.
First, parliamentary officials have a duty of impartiality to members. One
clerk explained that impartiality must be `demonstrate[d] to members . . .
[A]s long as they're content that it's impartial . . . then, that's me doing my
job.'127 Demonstrating this impartiality to parliamentarians, however,
presents challenges. On the one hand, one lawyer suggested that it requires
staff to be `overtly apolitical':
You've just got to show that you show no leanings at all one way or the other
because MPs, and peers as well, will pick up very quickly if you have, and you
lose your credibility very quickly.128
Similarly, Donald and Leach cite a former legal adviser to the Joint
Committee on Human Rights: `[t]he minute [parliamentarians] think the
advice reflects [the adviser's] own take on politically important questions,
they start to distrust [it].'129 At the same time, several interviewees explained
that staff must build trust by being `responsive'130 to parliamentarians of all
persuasions.131 In the intensely political environment of Parliament, staff
must work hard to both establish and maintain the perception of their
impartiality among members.
Second, staff interviewed indicated that they considered their place to be
in the background of a committee's work, and expected committee members
to take political responsibility for the conclusions and recommendations
offered in reports. This was a key aspect of committee autonomy: staff
advise, members decide. But this practice was also a means of maintaining
staff impartiality. One clerk described this as the `committee filter':132
The government [would] really get annoyed if the House was giving advice
contrary to government lawyers, it would get very politicised very quickly . . .
[I]f you do it through the prism of the committee, you've got a cross-party
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127 Interviewee 21, clerk (27 July 2017).
128 Interviewee 5, parliamentary lawyer (25 May 2017).
129 A. Donald and P. Leach, `The Role of Parliaments Following Judgments of the
European Court of Human Rights' in Parliaments and Human Rights, eds. M. Hunt
et al. (2015) 59, at 76.
130 Interviewee 10, parliamentary lawyer (27 June 2017).
131 Feldblum argues that any lawyer working in a legislative context `must establish . . .
bona fides with the political establishment. The key players must feel that the
legislative lawyer `` gets the political scene'' ± so that the legislative lawyer will be
fully trusted': C. Feldblum, `The Art of Legislative Lawyering and the Six Circles
Theory of Advocacy' (2003) 34 McGeorge Law Rev. 785, at 798.
132 Interviewee 11, clerk (29 June 2017).
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committee receiving the legal advice . . . choosing what they want to publish
and putting it out to the House and saying either `we do some amendments in
this area' or something. So, I think the committee . . . filter, it's quite a good
one.133
Thus, committee consensus and the general practice of integrating advice
into committee reports were regarded by staff as helping to depoliticize their
contribution.
Against this background, publishing legal advice was considered to risk
staff politicization. Several clerks and lawyers felt that the exposure of staff
advice would subject them to a greater risk of political criticism, under-
mining the perception of their non-political status among members, crucial
for the performance of their roles:
. . . There is a risk around exposing too much [of] the advice which committees
receive, because it will encourage people unhappy with the way the committee
is going to direct their fire at the advisers rather than at the committee, which
will make it very hard for the committee to get work done . . .134
I've also got reservations about it being published . . . [I]t encourages the sort
of lawyer shopping idea . . . People say, how big's your QC compared to their
QC? The legal advice shouldn't become itself an issue. It should be facilitating
discussion and debate and therefore, it shouldn't become an issue about what
the legal advice is . . .135
Thus, for clerks and lawyers alike, publishing advice potentially strips
legislative staff of the protection of the committee `filter', opens the legal
advice up to challenge (particularly if it clashed with the established
government position), and risks muddying the lines of political respon-
sibility. From the perspective of lawyers, however, publication also breaches
a core aspect of the standard conception of the lawyer's role: that they should
not be held responsible for the actions of their clients.
Arguably, these issues point to what Weingart describes as the
`inflationary'136 use of expertise in politics, whereby all opposing sides of
a debate seek to support their views with particular forms of expert evidence.
Such inflationary use has the effect of undermining the objective appearance
of expert claims, as they become associated with particular interests or
values.137 Viewed in that context, the concerns expressed by parliamentary
lawyers are not simply about the potential legalization of politics, but also
the potential politicization of law.
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136 P. Weingart, `Scientific Expertise and Political Accountability: Paradoxes of
Science in Politics' (1999) 26 Science and Public Policy 151, at 157.
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3. The soft power of parliamentary staff
Despite the formal autonomy of committees over their use of evidence and
information, there is some scope for parliamentary staff to resist the
publication of advice. Some clerks and lawyers interviewed said they would
seek to subtly dissuade parliamentarians from publishing advice. One
parliamentary lawyer suggested that they `always try to persuade them not to
[publish]'.138 Likewise, a clerk said: `If I'd been a clerk to a committee who
wanted to do that, I'd say, let's not publish a separate document, let's
literally take [the] advice and make it part of the reports.'139
Parliamentarians are, of course, free to ignore such counsel. However, the
views of staff can act as a powerful influence over committee decision
making. As one parliamentary lawyer explained:
[W]hat they normally do . . . is follow your advice and report to the House in
the way that you have advised . . . [T]here's never a situation where you advise
them strongly to do X and they won't do it . . . it just doesn't arise.140
This underlines the influence of legal advisers in particular Westminster
committee settings noted by various authors.141 It is also consistent with
research on the influence of legislative staff.142 Staff may not only be
influential in their areas of expertise. They may exercise a kind of soft power
within the committee setting, a power which is rooted in their particular
expertise but also extends beyond it. Turner suggests expert claims may
invite deference from non-expert audiences.143 Thus, experts may be
accorded `cognitive authority', which can also extend to the `penumbra' of
their expertise.144
Thus, clerks and parliamentary lawyers arguably enjoy cognitive authority
not only in relation to their respective procedural and legal expertise, but also
in relation to issues in the penumbra of those areas, such as the publication of
legal advice. Indeed, the rarity of legal advice being published separately,
even by committees with a legal remit, suggests an important staff influence
at work. It would appear that committee members can be constrained from
publishing legal advice in the pursuit of short-term political gain by the long-
term, institutional responsibilities of the staff. In short, parliamentary staff
can act as a soft constraint on committee autonomy.
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CONCLUSION
This article has opened up the `black box' of select committees and presents
a framework to understand the provision, reception, and use of one form of
in-house expertise ± legal advice. Legal advice provided to a select com-
mittee is subject to a negotiation between parliamentarians, clerks, and
parliamentary lawyers, the outcome of which determines its appropriate
relevance and use. In everyday practice, the roles of these actors converge to
privilege committee autonomy: clerks and parliamentary lawyers defer to
parliamentarians' varied attempts to exert influence in whatever way they
deem appropriate. Pressures towards the publication of legal advice,
however, can lead to a divergence between parliamentarians and parlia-
mentary staff. The tactical approach of parliamentarians is resisted by the
stewardship of clerks and the professional norms of parliamentary lawyers.
On this analysis, concerns about `juridification' or the legalization of
politics therefore seem exaggerated. In Westminster, it is partly organiza-
tional: lawyers are often limited by their compartmentalization within
committees. But it is also because, in everyday practice, the reach of law and
lawyers is quite limited. Moreover, parliamentary lawyers tend to cleave to a
`standard conception' of the lawyer's role, which strongly respects the
autonomy of the client, but also insists on the neutrality and non-
accountability of lawyers.
A push for greater transparency and increased publication of in-house
legal advice is likely to meet a number of obstacles. It ignores the very real
concerns of parliamentary staff to maintain their own impartiality ± and
therefore, effectiveness ± within the deeply politicized arena of Parliament.
It ignores the general disposition of parliamentary staff to remain in the
background. This is not just about staff concerns for impartiality. It is also
because of their strongly-held institutional and professional norms
prioritizing the autonomy of committees and `the client', and a related
concern about ensuring the focus of attention is on the decision of the
committee, and not the advisers. Finally, calls for greater transparency and
the publication of legal advice also ignore the fact that many parliamentary
lawyers may have multiple clients within the legislative context.145 An
expectation that advice for one particular function or client should be
published would not easily be quarantined to that sphere.
Publication of in-house legal advice may be of merit under certain
circumstances. But the pressures on and interests of parliamentarians are
such that they are unlikely to think carefully about whether or not the short-
term benefits of publishing in-house legal advice outweigh the potential
long-term institutional costs. They will be more concerned, in the immediate
28
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usually operate in a unified team.
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instance, to exert committee influence, and perhaps less cognisant of the
potential impact on staff impartiality, various informal practices by
parliamentary staff, and the inflationary effect on legal advice. Perhaps
one means to address this is to replace the current ad hoc approach by
official guidance, which could be provided to committees considering
publication. This would at the very least alert committees to some of the
broader issues involved. In turn, this could bring some consistency to the
decision to publish, and thereby help avoid any unforeseen and undesired
consequences.
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